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[Legal experts traditionally distinguish corporations from unincorporated business 
forms by focusing on such corporate characteristics as limited shareholder liability, 
centralised management, perpetual life, and freely transferred shares.  While this 
approach has value, this essay argues that the nature of the corporation can be 
better understood by focusing on a fifth, often-overlooked, characteristic of corpo-
rations:  their capacity to “lock in” equity investors’ initial capital contributions by 
making it far more difficult for those investors to subsequently withdraw assets from 
the firm.  Like a tar pit, a corporation is much easier for equity investors to get into, 
than to get out of. 
 
An emerging school of theorists has begun to explore the implications of this idea 
for corporate law and practice.  The idea is still novel enough to lack a uniformly-
accepted label—in addition to the phrase “capital lock-in,” scholars have de-
scribed this aspect of incorporation as “affirmative asset partitioning,” “the ab-
sence of a repurchase condition,” and “asset separation from shareholders.”  
Whatever label one chooses, the idea shows great promise for illuminating a variety 
of thorny problems that have long troubled corporate scholars and practitioners. 
 
In illustration, this essay considers how the idea of capital lock-in sheds light on 
three corporate mysteries in the United States: the sui generis nature of corporate 
directors’ fiduciary duties; the rise of the large modern service partnership; and 
lawmakers’ enthusiasm for meddling with corporate governance rules.]  
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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
Whenever lawyers discuss the differences between corporations and unincorporated 
business forms, one is inevitably reminded of the parable of the four blind men and 
the elephant.  Four blind men were invited to touch an elephant in order to learn 
more about its nature.  Approaching the elephant, the first blind man took hold of its 
trunk.  “Aha!” he cried. “The elephant is like a snake.”  The second blind man 
grabbed the pachyderm’s tail.  “No,” he said, “the elephant is like a rope.” The third 
blind man grasped a leg and announced, “I disagree. The elephant is like a tree.” 
The fourth blind man placed his palms against the animal’s side.  “You are each 
mistaken,” he observed.  “The elephant is like a wall.”  
 
Something similar happens whenever legal experts gather together to debate the 
essential difference between corporations and unincorporated business forms such 
as partnerships or proprietorships.  Some say limited liability is the key, and that 
what makes a corporation a corporation is the fact that equity investors are not 
personally liable for the entity’s debts.  Others argue that the hallmark of a corpora-
tion is the centralisation of control in the hands of a small group of individuals.  
Still others focus on the corporate characteristic of perpetual life, or the opportunity 
public corporations offer equity investors to freely transfer their shares in a liquid 
secondary market.1 
 
Each view is correct in its fashion.  Yet my sympathies lie with the arguments of an 
alternative, emerging school of corporate theorists.  These theorists might be lik-
ened to the fourth blind man who thought the elephant was like a wall.  They argue 
that the corporation also is like a wall—or, as some of the new school have put it, 
like a partition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Any student of corporate law is likely to recognise this list of characteristics as the four factors often 
cited as the essential and distinguishing marks of the corporate form.  See, for example, Robert C Clark, 
Corporate Law (1986) 2 (citing these four factors); Steven A Bank, ‘Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger: 
Toward An End to the Anachronistic Reliance on State Corporation Laws’ (1999) 77 North Carolina 
Law Review 1307, 1364-65 (describing how tax law traditionally used these four factors to distinguish 
corporations from other business forms). 
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II  “CAPITAL LOCK-IN” AND SPECIFIC INVESTMENT 
 
I am referring here to an idea that has been percolating through corporate scholar-
ship only for the past decade or so.  As a result it is still new enough to lack a uni-
versally-accepted label.  Henry Hansmaan and Reinier Kraakman have coined the 
phrase ‘affirmative asset partitioning’ to describe this important and increasingly 
talked-about characteristic of incorporated business.2  Economist Harold Demsetz 
has described it as ‘the absence of a repurchase condition,’3 while Bill Klein and 
Jack Coffee use the phrase ‘asset separation from shareholders.’4  In a recent article 
exploring the idea in depth, Margaret Blair has employed the pithy term ‘capital  
lock-in’ to capture this essential characteristic of the corporation form.5 
 
Whatever label one chooses--I adopt ‘capital lock-in’ below, on grounds of brevity 
and concreteness--the underlying idea is straightforward.  In brief, an essential if 
often-overlooked difference between unincorporated and incorporated business 
forms lies in the latter’s capacity to make it easier for equity investors to commit 
their financial contributions irretrievably to the firm.   A corporation’s assets belong 
to the corporation, and not to its equity investors.  As a result, those assets cannot be 
unilaterally withdrawn from the firm by either its shareholders, or by the creditors 
of its shareholders. 
 
To see how corporations differ from partnerships in this regard, consider the case of 
Adam, Betty, and Charlie, who each want to construct a widget factory.  No single 
one of them has enough financial capital to undertake the project.  Adam, Betty, and 
Charlie consequently decide to pool their resources, each contributing a third of the 
money needed.  If they do this under the default rules of partnership law, any one of 
the three investors can unilaterally demand the partnership be dissolved and the 
value of its assets distributed back to the partners—even if this requires the widget 
                                                        
2
 See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 
Yale Law Journal 387.  
3
 See Harold Demsetz, The Economics of the Business Firm: Seven Critical Commentaries (1995) 50-1.  
4
 See William A Klein and John C Coffee, Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic 
Principles (9th ed, 2004) 108. 
5
 See Margaret M Blair, ‘Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in 
the Nineteenth Century’ (2003) 51 UCLA Law Review 387.  The idea of capital lock-in both supports and 
is supported by other recent developments in corporate theory.  For example, in a series of articles 
written both alone and together, Margaret Blair and I have catalogued the many ways in which the law 
and practice of director governance in modern public corporations limits the ability of shareholders and 
other groups to withdraw assets from the firm without director approval, thus protecting and encouraging 
firm-specific investment. See Margaret M Blair and Lynn A Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Virginia Law Review 247, 275, 278; see also Margaret M Blair and Lynn A 
Stout, ‘Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board’ (2001) 79 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 403; Lynn A Stout, ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Pri-
macy’ (2002) 75 Southern California Law Review 1189; Lynn A Stout, ‘The Shareholder As Ulysses’ 
(2003) 152 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 667.  Stephen Bainbridge has also emphasised the 
importance of director governance for different reasons. See Stephen M Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: 
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97 Northwestern University Law Review 547. 
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factory to be dismantled or sold off.6  In essence, each partner retains the right to 
demand the return of the value of his or her interest in the partnership. 
 
In contrast, if Adam, Betty and Charlie form a corporation and each contributes 
money in return for one-third of its shares, it now becomes far more difficult for 
any one of the three to unilaterally withdraw the value of his or her share.  Under 
the default rules of corporate law, a shareholder who wants his or her money back 
must either (1) find a buyer willing to pay full price for his or her shares; (2) con-
vince the corporation’s board of directors to repurchase them; or (3) petition a court 
for redress (an unlikely scenario).  Like a tar pit, a corporation is much easier for an 
equity investor to get into, than to get out of. 
 
This quality of corporate entities—whether called affirmative asset partitioning, 
capital lock-in, or the absence of a repurchase condition—may come closer than 
any other to capturing the essential difference between incorporated and unincorpo-
rated business forms.  It may also go a long way towards explaining why the corpo-
ration has evolved into the dominant business form for pursuing certain kinds of 
large, long-term economic projects. 
 
To understand why, it is essential to recognise that while capital lock-in on first 
inspection seems to disadvantage equity investors, it offers important benefits for 
certain kinds of production.  In particular, a capacity to lock in investment capital 
may be essential for projects that require large amounts of firm-specific assets, 
meaning assets that cannot be withdrawn from the firm without destroying much of 
their value.  Specific assets can take a variety of forms.  They include, for example, 
sunk-cost investments—past expenditures of time or money made in the hope of 
future rewards.  Highly specialised equipment that cannot be easily converted for 
other uses also is firm-specific.  (The left rail of a railroad track is useless without 
the right rail). A third example is firm-specific human capital—managers’ and 
employees’ investment in knowledge, skills, and contacts that are uniquely useful to 
their present firm, and of little value to other potential employers.7 
 
The problem posed by firm-specific investment, and the way incorporation helps to 
solve it, can be illuminated by considering again the case of Adam, Betty, and 
Charlie.  Suppose each contributes a third of the money needed to construct a cus-
tomised widget manufacturing facility.  Once the money is spent and the factory 
                                                        
6
 See R. U. P. A §§ 801-807 (describing rules for dissolving and winding up partnerships after disassocia-
tion of partner); see also R. U. L. P. A §§ 801-812  (describing rules for dissolving and winding up 
limited partnerships after disassociation of general partner).  Similar default rules generally apply to the 
newly-developed business form called the Limited Liability Company (LLC). See, for example, U. L. L. 
C. A §§ 601, 602, 701 (describing how LLC members have presumptive right to disassociate from LLC 
at any time and to demand the LLC repurchase their interest for its fair value). 
7
 To say that firm-specific assets lose their value when withdrawn from the firm does not mean that all 
such assets can be locked in.  Employees can leave firms relatively easily, for example, and when they 
do the value of their firm-specific human capital evaporates.  Sometimes, however, it is possible to lock 
in investments, as in the case of the widget factory described in the text.  Locking in such investments 
can protect the value of other firm-specific assets by ensuring that the firm will remain alive and healthy 
for some period. 
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built, the three investors’ money has now been converted into an asset that is to a 
large extent specific to the widget-producing enterprise.  In lay terms, this means 
that each investor’s one-third share can achieve its highest value only when com-
bined with the other two-thirds.  (A third of a customised widget factory, alone, is 
not worth much, perhaps no more than its value as scrap metal.)  
 
As a result there is no easy way for any one of the three investors to withdraw his or 
her share without harming its value and, by extension, the collective value of the 
joint enterprise.  Adam, Betty, and Charlie—or any successors who buy their inter-
ests—reap the highest value from their investment by keeping the widget factory 
together and sharing in the profits from widget production.  As a result, if the busi-
ness is formed as a partnership, Adam, Betty, and Charlie must now worry that at 
some time in the future, one of the three co-investors will want, or need, to with-
draw his or her interest.  Adam may stay up late nights worrying that if Betty sees a 
wonderful investment opportunity come along, she might want to withdraw her 
one-third interest from the partnership, requiring a break-up or fire sale of the 
factory that threatens much of the value of the other two-thirds.  Betty may simi-
larly worry that Charlie, who is a compulsive gambler, will go to Atlantic City and 
lose big at the craps table, and that Charlie’s creditors—husky men with five 
o’clock shadows and New Jersey accents—may demand the value of his share, 
requiring the factory to either be dismantled or sold in a hasty fashion that threatens 
Betty’s investment. 
 
Co-investors who contribute to projects that require large amounts of firm-specific 
investment accordingly can find themselves at risk from each other, and from each 
others’ creditors.8  At the extreme, one could even imagine the spectacle of Adam, 
Betty and Charlie each opportunistically threatening to withdraw his or her one-
third interest in the widget partnership-- in effect, each threatening to take his or her 
third of the factory and go home—unless given 90% of the profits.9 
 
Unless these risks can be tempered, investors like Adam, Betty and Charlie might 
well decide against pooling their money to build a widget factory in the first place.  
Similarly, other complex economic projects that require the commitment of large 
amounts of specific assets over long periods of time–for example, building rail-
roads, canals, assembly lines, retail brands, communications networks, or software 
empires—may be discouraged if equity investors are free to unilaterally withdraw 
their interests.  As Demsetz has put it, ‘The corporation ... cannot be in continual 
jeopardy of losing  its assets to disappointed shareholders.’10 
 
                                                        
8
 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have emphasised how specific investments can pose problems 
for potential creditors of a joint enterprise, making it more difficult for large-scale joint enterprises to 
borrow money unless they can somehow assure lenders that essential specific assets will remain within 
the firm.  See Hansmann and Kraakman, above n 2. 
9
 As Larry Ribstein has pointed out, such extreme behavior might give rise claims of bad faith.  See 
Larry E Ribstein, ‘Are Partners Fiduciaries?’, University of Illinois Law Review (forthcoming, 2004)  
(May 27 draft) 35. 
10
 See Demsetz, above n 3, 51.  
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This is where the creation of an incorporated legal entity comes in handy.  Suppose 
that, instead of pooling their funds in a partnership, Adam, Betty and Charlie each 
contribute money to a corporation in return for a third of its stock.  Now the corpo-
ration uses the funds to build the widget factory.  The factory belongs to the corpo-
rate entity—not to Adam, Betty, and Charlie, who own only stock.  Owning stock 
gives them a right to cast votes to elect the corporation’s board of directors, and to 
participate in any dividends the board declares.  It does not, however, give them the 
unilateral right to withdraw their interests.  The factory can only be broken up, sold 
off, or distributed to the shareholders if this is agreeable to the party that as a matter 
of law controls the corporation’s assets—the corporation’s board of directors.  The 
end result is that, as long as neither Adam, nor Betty, nor Charlie enjoys complete 
control over the board (as none of three can without owning a clear majority of 
shares) all have “tied their own hands” by making it harder to withdraw their in-
vestments.11  This apparently self-defeating behaviour may in fact be self-serving, if 
it encourages profitable joint investment in the first place. 
 
The growing literature on capital lock-in accordingly suggests how an ability to 
stop investors (and their creditors) from subsequently withdrawing their interests in 
a joint project may be essential to many forms of economic production.  This does 
not mean that incorporation locks in capital completely: for example, under some 
circumstances, shareholders owning a majority or supermajority of shares can 
collectively demand a corporation be liquidated, or vote out a recalcitrant board that 
refuses to pay them a dividend as large as they would like.  Nor is incorporation the 
only way to lock in capital.  One could imagine a web of formal agreements, con-
tracts, and trusts by and among partners and their creditors that accomplish the 
same goal. 
 
But as both Blair and Hansmann and Kraakman have explained in some detail, 
incorporation may often be the cleanest, cheapest, and most effective way to lock 
assets into a joint enterprise.12   This observation may do much to explain the growth 
of the corporation into the dominant form of large-scale business today.  It may also 
be essential to understanding many aspects of corporate law and practice that are 
difficult to explain if we focus only on such much-cited corporate characteristics as 
limited liability, perpetual life, centralised management, or free transferability of 
interest. 
 
To test this hypothesis,13 I consider below whether the corporate characteristic of 
capital lock-in can offer insight into puzzles raised by three participants in the 
                                                        
11
 See Stout, ‘The Shareholder As Ulysses’, above n 5.  This analysis does not, of course, apply to 
corporations that have a single shareholder, and it applies to a lesser degree to firms with a single 
controlling shareholder.  Such situations are relatively rare, however.  Casual observation suggests that 
the vast majority of active, operating corporations of any significant size have multiple shareholders who 
have significant blocks, even though those shareholders may be relatively few in number.  
12
 See sources in above n  2, 5. 
13
 Because I did not select these three puzzles—the scholars who raised them were assigned to me for 
commentary before the conference organizer had any notion of my thesis—self-selection is not an issue 
in determining the results of the test.  Sample size certainly may be.  
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Symposium titled Uncorporation: A New Age, held at the University of Illinois 
College of Law in April 2004, where this article was originally presented.  These 
puzzles are (1) the unique nature of corporate directors’ fiduciary duties; (2) the 
distinction, if any, between corporations and partnerships in a world with both small 
close corporations and large-scale partnerships; and (3) the relative fondness state 
and federal lawmakers in the US seem to display for meddling with the rules that 
govern corporate entities.   
 
III  THREE PUZZLES 
 
Let us begin with the puzzle raised by Larry Ribstein’s contribution to the sympo-
sium: whether the duties that partners in a partnership owe each other can be de-
scribed as fiduciary duties.14 
 
Ribstein argues that it is a mistake to apply the concept of fiduciary duty to the 
relationship between partners in a partnership.  He suggests such broad use glosses 
over an important reality: partners are burdened with duties that are quite different 
from the archetypal fiduciary duties corporate law imposes on corporate directors.  
In particular, Ribstein emphasies that corporate directors are burdened by what he 
calls “a duty of unselfishness” —a legal demand that in managing the firm, they 
consider only what is best for the firm and its shareholders, and pay no attention 
whatsoever to what is best for themselves.15 
 
Two clarifications are worth making before we explore this idea further.  First, 
Ribstein’s argument compares partners’ duties with those of corporate directors.16  
Many corporate scholars might find this comparison jarring from the start.  In many 
ways, partners’ fiduciary duties seem to map much more closely onto the duties that 
corporate law imposes on controlling shareholders, than the duties corporate law 
imposes on directors.  This observation, and a possible explanation for it, are ex-
plored in greater detail below. 
 
Second, Ribstein’s “duty of unselfishness” might be more clearly labelled, at least 
in the director context, as a “duty of extreme unselfishness.”  Most legal rules 
demand some degree of unselfish behaviour.  The law against murder, for example, 
requires us to refrain from taking others’ lives even when this would be personally 
convenient or satisfying. Yet as Ribstein observes, the degree of unselfishness 
required of corporate directors goes far beyond what law demands of us in most 
contexts.  The rule of negligence, for example, demands we refrain from acciden-
tally injuring others when the probable losses (to them) exceed the costs of taking 
                                                        
14 
 See Ribstein, above n 9. 
15
 Ibid 9. 
16  Ibid 4-5. 
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precautions (to us).  But we are free to behave selfishly by imposing “efficient” 
risks on others.17   
 
In contrast, a corporate director’s fiduciary duty of loyalty precludes her from 
considering her own interests to any extent.  In making business decisions, directors 
are supposed to focus only on what’s best for the firm and its shareholders.  They 
are also restricted from using their positions to extract any personal pecuniary 
benefit beyond their agreed-upon directors’ fees.  If a director should find herself in 
a situation where she could personally profit from voting for one business strategy 
rather than another (as directors sometimes do, especially when they also fill execu-
tive roles), the business judgment rule no longer insulates her decision from judicial 
scrutiny.  Instead, if a director takes a “corporate opportunity” or enters an “inter-
ested” transaction with her firm, a disgruntled shareholder can bring a claim of 
breach of duty of loyalty, and the burden will be on the director to demonstrate to 
the court that her decisions were intrinsically fair to the firm and its shareholders.18   
 
Partnership law takes quite a different approach.  Unlike corporate directors, part-
ners are not burdened with a duty of extreme unselfishness: they are not automati-
cally subject to legal scrutiny when they make decisions that enrich themselves.  To 
the contrary, this is an expected benefit of being a partner.  Of course, partners are 
subject to other duties, including the basic requirement that, when a partner causes 
the partnership to distribute wealth, he be prepared to share that wealth with his 
fellow partners.19  But no one expects partners to ignore their own interests in 
making business decisions. 
 
Why does corporate law demand so much more selflessness from corporate direc-
tors than the default rules of partnership demand from partners?  Ribstein argues the 
answer can be found in the relative vulnerability of investors in firms with central-
ized management.  Looking at the problem through the lens of the capital lock-in 
literature offers deeper insight into this explanation. 
 
In brief, the idea that corporations exist primarily to lock in capital suggests that 
corporate directors and partners are burdened with different legal duties because 
they play very different economic roles in firms.  Partners are co-investors who 
expect to act as “residual claimants” in the partnership: that is, to share in any 
                                                        
17 See David W Barnes and Lynn A Stout, Cases and Materials on Law and Economics (1992) (discuss-
ing rule of negligence).  
18
 See generally Blair and Stout, ‘Team Production’, above n 5, 298-99 (discussing duty of loyalty).  In 
addition to their duty of loyalty, directors in the US also owe their firms a duty of care.  The duty of care 
demands a more limited degree of unselfishness in the sense that, like the negligence rule, it requires 
directors only to exercise “reasonable” (not obsessive) care.  Thus after directors have met some mini-
mum standard, they can devote the balance of their time and attention to their own projects. The degree 
of self-interested director behavior allowed under the duty of care is expanded still further by the busi-
ness judgment rule, which insulates directors from liability for their decisions provided they do not 
extract any personal benefit and are duly “informed.” See generally Lynn A Stout, ‘In Praise of Proce-
dure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule’ (2002) 96 
Northwestern University Law Review 765. 
19
 See Ribstein, above n 9, 37 (discussing sharing rule in partnerships). 
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profits the business makes after it has paid its contractual debts to its employees, 
creditors, and so forth.  The economic role that partners play in partnerships thus is 
analogised best not to the role played by directors in corporations, but to the role 
played by shareholders.  This is why the “fiduciary duty” corporate law imposes on 
controlling shareholders—most significantly, a duty not to use their control over the 
firm to cause the firm to make payments to them that the minority shareholders do 
not also receive— resembles the sharing duty partnership law imposes on part-
ners.20   
 
Directors play a very different part in corporations, and as a consequence, are 
subject to very different legal constraints.  Unlike shareholders, directors qua direc-
tors are neither investors nor residual claimants in the firm.21   Indeed, a director can 
join a board without making any investment whatsoever, and her only legal claims 
on the firm’s assets are her right to her promised director’s fee and her right to be 
indemnified for expenses she incurs on the corporation’s behalf. Thus corporate 
directors, unlike shareholders or partners, have no incentive to try to withdraw 
essential assets from the corporation. To the contrary, if they want to keep their 
firms alive and healthy (and so keep their positions as directors), they want to 
discourage other groups, such as shareholders, from trying to withdraw too large a 
share of the firm’s assets.  
 
In other writings, Margaret Blair and I have explored this peculiarity of director’s 
incentives in some detail.  We propose that it explains why shareholders in public 
corporations take the otherwise-puzzling step of ceding control over firms to boards 
in the first place.22  Applying team production analysis, we argue that co-investors 
in projects that need large commitments of specific capital often understand intui-
tively that, in order to protect the value of the joint project, they need to place 
control over it into the hands of someone who has neither motive nor easy opportu-
nity to profit from withdrawing assets from the firm.23   In a corporation, this 
                                                        
20
 Ibid 17 (discussing sharing rule applied to controlling shareholders); see also James D Cox and 
Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporations (2003) 258 (noting that especially in close corporations, ‘the control-
ling shareholder’s fiduciary obligation is increasingly being viewed as akin to the obligation that partners 
owe to one another’). 
21
 Individuals who serve as directors of the firm may be able to extract assets from the firm if they also 
play roles as shareholders or officers.  When they do, however, their decisions are no longer privileged 
under the business judgment rule, but are instead subject to additional legal duties and judicial oversight.  
See text in above n 15-18 (discussing directors’ interested transactions and controlling shareholders’ 
duties). 
22
 See generally Blair and Stout, ‘Team Production’, above n 5, 315-19 (discussing directors’ role); 
Stout, ‘Shareholder as Ulysses’, above n 5, 685-88 (discussing directors’ incentives). 
23
 This solution to the problem of encouraging specific joint investment has a catch, of course.  Because 
directors are not residual claimants, they do not have an incentive to withdraw resources from the firm, 
but they also do not have an incentive to run the firm with maximum efficiency.  Instead, as we actually 
observe, directors manage firms in a satisficing, but suboptimal, fashion.  This “second best” solution 
may nevertheless be the most attractive of the available alternatives in a world where economic produc-
tion can require massive amounts of firm-specific investment that cannot be adequately protected by 
formal contract.  See generally Blair and Stout, ‘Team Production’, above n 5, 319 (discussing second 
best nature of board governance); Stout, ‘Shareholder as Ulysses’, above n 5, 685-88 (same). 
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“someone” is a board of directors subject to the severe constraints on self-interest 
imposed by the rules of fiduciary duty. 
 
Understanding the unusual role directors play in corporations consequently sheds 
light on the sui generis nature of directors’ fiduciary duties.  It also supports Rib-
stein’s argument that we may lose important information when we apply the same 
label to directors’ duties that we apply to the duties partners and shareholders owe 
each other.  And it is certainly a mistake to apply the word “fiduciary” to still-more-
distant relationships, such as relationships among family members.  Thus Ribstein 
rightly criticises the Second Circuit’s opinion in Chestman v United States, which 
suggested that confidential relationships among various members of the Waldbaum 
family might give rise to “the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship” for 
purposes of creating insider trading liability.24 
 
A focus on the capital lock-in function of incorporation, and on the unique govern-
ance role boards of directors play in upholding that function, accordingly helps 
explain both the peculiar nature of director’s fiduciary duties as “mediating hier-
archs” in a public corporation, and the ways these duties differ from partners’ and 
shareholders’ duties to each other as co-investors.25    Similarly, it may offer insight 
into a second problem explored in the symposium, in Robert Hillman’s paper on the 
distinctions between partnerships and corporations in terms of bargaining and 
management structure.26 
 
Hillman’s paper starts with a conundrum.  He notes that one of the standard distinc-
tions thought to exist between partnership law and corporate law is that partnerships 
are believed to be more flexible, and to permit a much greater degree of bargaining 
over firm structure than normally is practicable in a corporation.  He also notes that 
egalitarian management and shared power are thought to be hallmarks of a partner-
ship.  In contrast, highly centralised and hierarchical management styles are thought 
to be the norm in corporations.   
 
Hillman then points out a pair of interesting and telling anomalies.  These are small, 
closely-held corporations, and large modern partnerships such as law firms or 
accounting firms.  Hillman argues that these common business forms pose a chal-
                                                        
24
 United States v Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991), cert den., 503 U.S. 1004 (1992). See 
Ribstein, above n 9, 21-22 (discussing the Chestman decision).  As Ribstein describes in some detail, 
such loose use of legal language can be costly, increasing the cost of negotiating transactions, increasing 
the risk of opportunistic litigation, and raising the possibility that overuse will ‘squander the moral 
authority’ of courts who employ the word ‘fiduciary.’  Ibid 29.  Although at the end of the day one might 
conclude that there is little harm done by applying the word ‘fiduciary’ broadly so long as courts and 
business people understand the distinction between the relationships and duties that business participants 
owe each other in particular circumstances, I believe Ribstein has succeeded in placing the burden of 
persuasion on those who would advance this argument. 
25
 See generally Blair and Stout, ‘Team Production’, above n 5, 276-87 (discussing directors’ roles as 
mediating hierarchs). 
26
 See Robert W Hillman, ‘The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law, Corporate Law, and Private 
Ordering With Closely-Held Business Associations’, University of Illinois Law Review (forthcoming 
2004)(April 9 draft). 
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lenge to any claim that partnerships are characterised by flexibility and more egali-
tarian management than corporations.  After all, in the typical close corporation 
there may a great deal of effort devoted to negotiating customised charter terms and 
bylaws (or what’s referred to in Australia as the ‘corporate constitution’), and 
shareholder agreements, and this flexibility is supported by the basic rules of corpo-
ration law.  Close corporation shareholders also usually are active participants in the 
firm’s day-to-day management.  Conversely, in a large service partnership (think of 
the law firm or accounting firm with offices in ten different cities), it is unrealistic 
to believe that any real bargaining occurs when a new partner is welcomed into a 
thousand-member firm.  Moreover, and in contrast to the egalitarian management 
observed in many close corporations, these large partnerships are usually character-
ised by the same sorts of hierarchical management structures we see in the Fortune 
500. 
 
In other words, Hillman observes, neither the presence nor the absence of bargain-
ing, nor the choice of centralised or decentralised management, seem to be immuta-
ble characteristics of either partnerships or incorporated business forms.  What then 
distinguishes the two?27 
 
Incorporation’s capacity to lock in investor capital may provide the answer.  In 
particular, a focus on capital lock-in suggests that incorporation may often be attrac-
tive not because it makes centralised management easier or when flexibility is 
unnecessary, but because a particular form of economic production demands a high 
degree of firm-specific investment, making an ability to keep those investments in 
the firm essential to the firm’s health. 
 
This approach offers a useful and testable prediction: we should expect to see 
systematic differences between the types of businesses that are incorporated as large 
corporations, and the types that are run as large partnerships.  Most obviously, we 
should expect large firms to be organised as partnerships only for economic projects 
where firm-specific investment either is relatively unimportant, or locking in that 
investment is for some reason impracticable. 
 
This approach may explain why large partnerships have evolved primarily in client-
centered service industries like accounting and law.  In these industries, human 
capital investments often are the primary source of firm value.  To a very large 
extent, those human capital investments are not firm-specific but instead take form 
of general human capital (eg, active membership in a particular legal association or 
expertise in a type of accounting) that a partner can easily take from one firm to 
another.  Much of the balance may be “client-specific” human capital—knowledge 
of and contacts with a particular client—which again can often be moved relatively 
easily, with little loss in value. Thus, because firm-specific investment is of rela-
tively little importance to the typical law or accounting firm (and, given the mobil-
                                                        
27
 At one time it might be argued that professional rules precluded law firms from incorporating.  Now, 
however, most states permit law firms to incorporate or to use “professional corporation” business forms. 
A high percentage of large law firms nevertheless retain a partnership structure.  
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ity of labour, very difficult to lock in anyway), the capital lock-in advantages of 
incorporation have little appeal.28 
 
A focus on capital lock-in consequently may promote a better understanding of the 
fundamental economic differences between partnerships and corporations just as it 
promotes a better understanding of the unique nature of director’s fiduciary duties.  
Can it also tell us something about the third puzzle posed by Saul Levmore in his 
remarks at the symposium conference at the University of Illinois College of Law: 
the puzzle of why both state and federal lawmakers in the US seem so much more 
willing to meddle in (and so much more interested in meddling with) the govern-
ance rules that apply to corporations, than the rules that apply to unincorporated 
business forms?29 
 
Once again, capital lock-in provides at least some of the answer.  This is not to 
suggest capital lock-in explains all the enthusiasm lawmakers show for regulating 
corporations, or that other explanations may not exist as well.  Yet corporations’ 
unique ability to attract and lock in large amounts of firm-specific investment—an 
ability derived in large part from the possibility of lock-in—may go far towards 
explaining why zealous regulators seem far more interested in intervening in the 
“internal affairs” of corporations, than they do in intervening in the internal govern-
ance structures of other sorts of business organisations. 
 
In brief, by acting as sinks for large amounts of firm specific investment, corpora-
tions make themselves especially tempting targets for “rent-seeking” legislation.   
This argument relies on the so-called economic theory of legislation, which posits 
that interest groups often seek to “bribe” lawmakers with campaign contributions 
and lobbyist attention, in hope of getting them to pass legal rules that favour the 
interest group (often at some other group’s expense).30  Savvy regulators may also 
seek to extract “blackmail” payments from interest groups by entertaining proposed 
changes in law or regulation that threaten those groups’ welfare.31  Because of 
capital lock-in, corporations should attract this type of lawmaking, and this type of 
lawmaker, the way a large carcass attracts flies. 
 
To understand why, it is important to understand that board governance does more 
than encourage equity investors to make investments in corporations.  By locking in 
capital, board governance also attracts firm-specific investments and commitments 
                                                        
28  Anecdotal evidence of the relative unimportance of firm-specific investment to lawyers and account-
ants may be found by observing what happens to lawyers and accountants whose firms collapse (e.g., the 
accountants at Arthur Anderson).  My sense is that most of these individuals quickly find similar posi-
tions at other firms. 
29
 See comments of Saul Levmore, University of Illinois College of Law Conference on Uncorporation: 
A  New Age, held April 23, 2004, Chicago, Illinois.   
30
 See generally Barnes and Stout, above n 17, 476-91 (surveying theory of interest group rent-seeking). 
31
 See Fred S McChesney, ‘Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of 
Regulation’ (1991) 20 Journal of Legal Studies 73 (arguing that lawmakers sometimes blackmail interest 
groups). 
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from a variety of other groups as well.32  Unsecured creditors, for example, may be 
more willing to lend to the firm.  Employees from the shop floor to the corner office 
may be more willing to acquire firm-specific skills and to contribute extra hours and 
extra effort.  Even customers and the local community may make specific invest-
ments and contributions, on the assumption the firm will stick around for some 
period of time—consider the case of the consumer who masters a particular soft-
ware program, or the town that builds roads, schools, and other specialised infra-
structure to support a factory. 
 
By attracting large amounts of specific investment from so many different constitu-
encies, corporations turn these constituencies into potential adversaries who may 
benefit or suffer from changes in the firm’s structure that reallocate shares of the 
corporate pie.  Shareholders seeking better profits, for example, may lobby to shut 
down expensive US-based production and move manufacturing abroad, while local 
employees and communities lobby to keep factories at home.  Normally such com-
peting constituencies focus their attentions on the company’s board of directors, 
trying to convince the board to adopt whichever business strategy favours their 
interests.  Shareholders ask for larger dividends, executives seek bigger bonuses, 
and rank-and-file employees lobby for pensions or a better health plan. 
 
As an alternative, however, competing corporate constituencies can sometimes try 
to do an end run around board governance by turning to lawmakers as vehicles for 
rent seeking from other participants in the firm—other participants who can’t pro-
tect their firm-specific interests simply by withdrawing them.  Lawmakers accord-
ingly can attract a great deal of attention (and campaign contributions) by 
responding to appeals from various corporate participants to change the rules in the 
middle of the corporate game.  Consider, for example, how a state legislator consid-
ering a “constituency statute” might suddenly become popular with unions, institu-
tional investors, and the Business Roundtable.  Similarly, the Securities Exchange 
Commission in recent months has enjoyed the frenzied attention of the business 
world by playing with the notion of “reforming” the shareholder proxy process to 
give shareholders greater power.33 
 
These sorts of regulatory initiatives tend to provoke strong reactions from various 
corporate constituencies, because those constituencies have large amounts of firm-
specific investment at risk.  In contrast, legislators have far less power to threaten 
the interests of investors in enterprises who can easily withdraw their investments.  
Any legislative attempt to intervene in the “internal affairs” of large law partner-
ships, for example, is unlikely to provoke much in the way of lobbying efforts or 
campaign contributions.  The reason is simple—unlike shareholders whose interests 
are diluted by executive stock options or communities whose economies rely on a 
                                                        
32
 See generally Blair and Stout, ‘Team Production’, above n 5, 302-09; Stout, ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad 
Arguments’, above n  5, 1195-98. 
33
 See, for example, Louis Lavelle, Governance: Backlash in the Executive Suite, Business Weekly, June 
14, 2004, 37 (describing how the US Securities Exchange Commission’s proposal to change proxy rules 
has triggered lobbying by a variety of institutional investors, union organisations, and corporate manag-
ers, as well as the Business Roundtable in the US). 
 788   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 9 NO 2 
 
factory, a disgruntled law partner can simply leave one law firm to join or start 
another, taking his general human capital and client-specific human capital with 
him.  Thus regulators and politicians like to tinker with corporate governance rules 
more than they like to tinker with partnership governance rules for the same reason 
Willy Sutton liked to rob banks: because that’s where the money is. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
This article has explored the value of the concept of capital lock-in as a fundamen-
tal characteristic of corporations by suggesting how it may shed light on three 
different corporate mysteries: the unique nature of directors’ fiduciary duties; the 
evolution of the large modern service partnership; and the peculiar fascination 
lawmakers seem to have for tinkering with the rules that govern corporations’ 
internal affairs.  In each case, inspecting the problem through the lens of the emerg-
ing scholarship on capital lock-in goes a long way towards developing our under-
standing.  These three examples accordingly support the view that capital lock-in is 
an essential, if previously overlooked, characteristic of the corporate form that does 
much of the work that needs to be done to distinguish corporations from unincorpo-
rated business forms. 
 
This observation is subject to two important caveats.  First, I do not intend to sug-
gest that capital lock-in is somehow unique to corporations.  How easily equity 
investors can withdraw their investments is a variable that exists along a continuum 
of business forms.  At one extreme of the continuum, the owner of a sole proprie-
torship can withdraw resources almost without restriction.   At the other extreme, in 
large public corporations, shareholders’ returns depend almost entirely on the 
decisions of a board largely insulated from their command and control.  Partner-
ships, limited partnerships, close corporations, and the US business form known as 
the LLC lie somewhere in between, depending on their structure and governance 
provisions.  And just as we have seen a trend toward allowing other business forms 
to adopt such typically corporate characteristics as limited liability or centralised 
management, we can expect to see business law move (perhaps more slowly) to-
ward allowing other forms to adopt greater capital lock-in.34  
 
The second caveat is that, in exploring the role of capital lock-in, I do not intend to 
suggest that other variables that corporate scholars traditionally have emphasised 
are somehow unimportant or irrelevant.  To the contrary, there are a variety of 
significant issues in business law and practice that are best understood by focusing 
on such traditionally-emphasised corporate characteristics as limited liability or free 
                                                        
34
 An example may be found in the default rules for limited liability partnerships in the US, which do not 
permit limited partners to unilaterally dissociate from the firm and demand its winding up, but give 
unilateral withdrawal rights only to general partners. See  U. L. P. A §§601-604, 801-803 (describing 
rules for limited partner disassociation and for dissolving and winding up limited partnerships after 
disassociation of general partner). 
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transferability of shares (although in some cases, these characteristics may them-
selves be better understood by taking account of lock-in).35  To return to the parable, 
just as each of the blind men was correct to say that the elephant was like a snake, a 
rope, and a tree, corporate scholars and practitioners are correct to observe that 
public corporations tend to have limited liability, perpetual life, centralised man-
agement, and freely transferable shares, and that each of these can explain many 
aspects of business law and practice. 
 
Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that for now and for many years to come, 
the scholarly returns from analysing corporations through the lens of the emerging 
literature on capital lock-in may often exceed the scholarly returns from following 
more customary approaches.  In part this is because the idea of capital lock-in is 
relatively novel, and its scholarly terrain has only begun to be explored.  As a result 
the new school holds great promise for explaining a wide variety of issues that have 
long troubled corporate scholars and practitioners.  Yet innovation alone may not 
explain all the power of this emerging concept.  Board governance and capital lock-
in, while not the only characteristics to separate corporations from other business 
forms, may well prove in many cases to be the most vital and unique characteristics.  
Put differently, if I were forced to choose, I would adopt the perspective of the blind 
man who thought the elephant resembled a wall.  Like the scholar or practitioner 
who thinks the corporation resembles a partition, he may have come closest to the 
heart of the beast. 
 
                                                        
35
 For example, corporations may have evolved freely transferable shares as a means of compensating for 
the illiquidity equity investors would otherwise suffer as a result of lock-in. 
